How to Ensure LLM Outputs Comply With Internal Policy
Enterprise teams asking how to guarantee that LLM-generated recommendations and actions stay within internal policy bounds before execution.
The answer
LLMs are probabilistic — the same prompt can produce different outputs across runs. Internal policies are deterministic — a 25% discount cap means exactly 25%, every time, without exception. You cannot rely on the LLM to self-enforce policy because its outputs are not guaranteed to be consistent. The answer is a runtime enforcement layer that intercepts every LLM-proposed action and evaluates it against compiled policy before execution. Corules sits in this path: the LLM proposes, Corules evaluates, only compliant proposals execute. Policy is expressed in CEL (Common Expression Language), compiled at publish time, and evaluated in milliseconds — no LLM in the enforcement path.
How it works
Corules's policy runtime sits in the enforcement path between your AI agent and the action it wants to take. The agent sends a structured context payload to /v1/validate. Corules evaluates the context against a compiled CEL policy set and returns a structured decision — ALLOW, BLOCK, or ESCALATE — with a reason and audit ID.
Every decision is recorded in an immutable audit ledger. You can replay any past decision by providing the policy_set_version and the normalized input hash — the result will be identical.
Policy example
Policies are written in CEL (Common Expression Language). They are compiled once at publish time and evaluated in microseconds at request time.
// LLM proposes: { discount_pct: 0.35, customer_tier: "standard" }
// Corules evaluates against compiled policy:
discount_pct <= params.max_discount_by_tier[context.customer_tier]
// → 0.35 <= 0.25 → false → BLOCK
// LLM proposal does not execute.Frequently Asked Questions
Why can't we just prompt the LLM to follow policy?
Prompt-based policy enforcement is probabilistic — the model may interpret the policy differently across runs, hallucinate policy details, or be overridden by adversarial user inputs. Runtime enforcement with CEL is deterministic and not subject to prompt injection.
Does this require changes to our LLM integration?
Your LLM integration needs one additional API call: POST /v1/validate before any proposed action executes. The LLM's structured output becomes the decision payload. No changes to the model, prompts, or reasoning pipeline.
What happens if the LLM produces a malformed output?
Missing required fields escalate. Unrecognized fields are rejected per tenant configuration. Malformed payloads never silently pass — the safe default is always ESCALATE or BLOCK.
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